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How options are framed can dramatically inﬂuence choice preference. While salience of
information plays a central role in this effect, precisely how it is mediated by attentional
processes remains unknown. Current models assume a simple relationship between
attention and choice, according towhich preference should be uniformly biased towards the
attended item over the whole time-course of a decision between similarly valued items.
To test this prediction we considered how framing alters the orienting of gaze during a
simple choice between two options, using eye movements as a sensitive online measure
of attention. In one condition participants selected the less preferred item to discard and
in the other, the more preferred item to keep. We found that gaze gravitates towards the
item ultimately selected, but did not observe the effect to be uniform over time. Instead,
we found evidence for distinct early and late processes that guide attention according to
preference in the ﬁrst case and task demands in the second. We conclude that multiple
time-dependent processes govern attention during choice, and that these may contribute
to framing effects in different ways.
Keywords: attention, eye movements, decision making, reward processing, framing effect, decision bias,
approach/avoidance
INTRODUCTION
How the human brain selects beneﬁcial actions under biologi-
cally determined limits of processing is a central question in the
study of decision behavior. Classical economics considers choice
from the standpoint of a rational actor, whose behavior optimally
maximizes gain and minimizes loss, abstracting away many of
the ecological factors that inﬂuence choice in the real world. The
historical roots of psychiatry, on the other hand, lie in disentan-
gling the complex array of motives that drive behavior, which
seems often as not to defy any rational account. More recently,
scientiﬁc focus has centered on the importance of constraints on
rational decision-making grounded in the requirements of biolog-
ical computation in the real world (Simon, 1955), giving rise to a
large and highly inﬂuential body of literature at the intersection of
economics and psychology (Simon, 1956; Kahneman, 2011). Two
core insights to come from this work are that logically extrane-
ous information frequently inﬂuences our choices, giving rise to
so-called framing effects (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981), and that
behavior often appears to be guided not by a unitary rational actor
but by multiple distinct systems, which apply differing strategies
of learning and response generation in different contexts (Daw
et al., 2005).
Framing effects depend in large part on the salience of informa-
tion that bears on a decision,which in turn depends on themanner
in which a choice is presented (Shaﬁr, 1993). Attentional pro-
cesses therefore must play a central role in framing, but precisely
which processes and what roles remain open questions. Studies
that examine framing effects introduce an external, if implicit,
manipulation of attention, yet the origin, time-course and other
details of this process in the context of decision-making have not
been clearly delineated.
Studies that consider the relationship between choice and atten-
tion by measuring patterns of eye movements leading up to a
decision have found that gaze gravitates increasingly towards the
item ultimately chosen. Twomodels explain this effect in different
ways. The “gaze cascade model” (Shimojo et al., 2003) supposes
that preference and attention exert a bidirectional inﬂuence on
each other with attention gravitating towards the preferred option,
as the attended option also becomes more preferred through
the “mere exposure effect”(Zajonc, 1968), resulting in a self-
reinforcing cycle. A more recently proposed model explains the
relationship through the enhancement of inputs from the attended
option in biasing the direction of a drift-diffusion process, (Kra-
jbich et al., 2010). In contrast to the gaze cascademodel, thismodel
assumes no reverse inﬂuence of preference on attention. Both
models predict that external manipulations of attention should
alter choice outcome, reminiscent of framing effects, and some
evidence bears out these predictions (Armel et al., 2008). To date,
however, no model offers a detailed account of how framing
inﬂuences attention over the course of a decision.
We hypothesized that framing would inﬂuence the evolution
of gaze culminating in a simple choice. To test this hypothesis,
framing was manipulated during a forced choice between two
visually presented foods. Subjects selected the preferred item to
keep (“keep frame”) in one instance and the less preferred item to
discard in the other (“discard frame”). Eye movements, recorded
continuously over the course of the trial, provided a time-speciﬁc
online measure of attention. Our framing manipulation allowed
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us to distinguish separate contributions of preference and task
demands in guiding attention. The latter reﬂected the so-called
response compatibility (Fitts and Seeger, 1953) of the stimulus :
subjects directed their gaze more to the chosen item during the
keep frame and the discarded item during the discard frame. This
ﬁnding appears to preclude a simple relationship between atten-
tion andpreference, as the less preferred itemwasmore attended in
the discard condition.We also observed twomoment-by-moment
patterns that challenge the assumption of a single process, which
biases choice and attention uniformly in one direction or another,
as suggested by the models previously mentioned (Shimojo et al.,
2003; Krajbich et al., 2010). Our ﬁndings suggest instead that eye
movements are inﬂuencedbothbypreference andby framing, each
with a distinct and non-overlapping time course. In both condi-
tions, gaze was rapidly and transiently directed to the preferred
stimulus within 500 ms, followed by a monotonically growing
bias towards the response-compatible item. We interpret these
two phases as evidence for the inﬂuence of multiple processes on
attention over the course of a decision, with preference-driven
responses dependent on a more rapid and transient process. We
consider the possible implications of our ﬁndings for the origin




All stimuli are composed of images selected from a set of 77 foods.
The stimulus set, identical to those used by Krajbich et al. (2010),
contains items expected to be appetitive for the subject, such as
common snack foods. In the rating block, all 77 stimuli were
presented. In the subsequent choice blocks pairs of stimuli were
selected from those given a positive rating on the rating task.
Rating task
Subjects were sequentially presented with all 77 images of food
items on an LCDmonitor. Using a slider with 20 tickmarks labeled
−10 to 10, subjects were instructed to rate each item on howmuch
the he or she liked the item, where −10 indicated strong dislike
and +10 strong liking.
Stimuli for the choice tasks
Following the rating block, the difference of ratings was computed
among all pairs of positively rated stimuli. Each pair was assigned
a weighting score computed as the inverse of the overall frequency
of stimulus pairs with the given difference. Pairs of stimuli were
selected iteratively in proportion to weighting in order to achieve
an approximately uniform distribution of differences across the
range of −5 to +5. Weight on selected pairs was decreased at each
selection in order to decrease the likelihood of repeating pairs.
This procedure was designed after that of Krajbich et al. (Krajbich
et al., 2010).
Experiment 1
Subjects were presented 275 randomly selected pairs of positively
rated food items across two blocks and asked to choose one item
from the pair. In both blocks, participants viewed a ﬁxation cross
for a variable 500–1000 ms period after which a pair of food items
was presented. After viewing the two options for 1000ms, the par-
ticipant was prompted with the question “Which do you prefer?”
and selected with a button press one snack to keep. Following the
response, the selected itemwas highlighted. The procedure follows
the method and stimulus set used by Krajbich et al. (2010) with
the addition of a delayed response window.
Experiment 2
Results of Experiment 1 led us to develop a second version of the
task, which introduced manipulations of framing and response-
cue delay. As in Experiment 1, subjects were presented 275
randomly selected pairs of positively rated food items and asked
to choose one item from the pair. A second group of subjects
participated in this experiment.
Variable response-cue delay. In order to rule out the possibility
that the gaze response observed in Experiment 1 reﬂected the ﬁxed
timing of the response cue, which appeared at 1000 ms, a variable
delay of 750–1750 ms was added between the appearance of the
choice stimulus and response cue.
Framing manipulation. Each subject completed two blocks, a
keep block (K) and discard block (D). In the keep block, partici-
pants viewed a ﬁxation cross for a variable 500–1000 ms period,
after which a pair of food items was presented. After viewing the
two options for a variable period, the participant was prompted
with the question “Which one to keep?” and selected one snack
to keep with a button press. The chosen item was highlighted
with a yellow box. In the discard version participants were instead
prompted with the question “Which one to discard?” and selected
one food item to discard (Figure 1). Following the response, the
discarded item was highlighted with a superimposed yellow “X”.
Subjects were informed that at the end of the task they would
receive the chosen food from a randomly selected trial.
SUBJECTS
For Experiment 1, 20 individuals were recruited from the Uni-
versity of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics community (seven male, 13
female). Ages ranged from 20 to 64, with a mean age of 38. For
Experiment 2, a second sample of 23 individuals was recruited (8
male, 15 female). Ages ranged from19 to 63, with amean age of 34.
All subjects provided voluntary informed consent in accordance
with the requirements of the University of Iowa Biomedical Inter-
nal Review Board and regulations of the USDepartment of Health
and Human Services before participating in any experiment.
ACQUISITIONS AND PREPROCESSING OF GAZE DATA
Eyemovementsweremonitoredwith a remotelymounted infrared
video eye tracker (Eyelink 1000, SR Research, Kanata, ON,
Canada). Eye position data are sampled at 1 kHz, and ﬁxation
onsets were determined using a velocity threshold criterion as
implemented in Eyelink software. Further data analysis was car-
ried out using custom developed scripts in Matlab (Mathworks,
Nattick, MA, USA).
To analyze gaze data in the decision task, we treated gaze posi-
tion as a binary variable, indicating ﬁxation to the left or right
item. As the distribution of ﬁxations typically showed distinct
modes associated with the left and right stimulus and ﬁxation
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FIGURE 1 | spaceskip=0.2pcStructure of the task. Subjects were cued to
respond after a 1 s delay from the appearance of the stimuli. In the “keep”
version (K), subjects selected the preferred item and in the “discard” version
(D), subjects discarded the less preferred item. The small food images are
modiﬁed from the stimulus set developed by Ian Krajbich and Antonio Rangel
and shared with us.
cross, a mixture of Gaussians (MOG) with three component dis-
tributions was ﬁtted to the horizontal screen coordinate, and
ﬁxations were classiﬁed as left, right or middle if the respon-
sibility weight for the corresponding distribution exceeded 0.7.
This data-driven approach to classiﬁcation was chosen over a
simpler region-of-interest-based method in order to improve
robustness to calibration error in the gaze position. Middle ﬁx-
ations and ﬁxations for which the responsibility weight did not
exceed 0.7 for any of the three distributions were discarded from
subsequent analysis. Fitted distributions were visually inspected
against the histogram of ﬁxation positions in order to ensure
that MOG optimization converged appropriately. In the case
of failed convergence, starting parameters of the component
Gaussians were adjusted manually until ﬁtting converged suc-
cessfully. After classiﬁcation, ﬁxation data were converted to a
time series in which rightward ﬁxations were coded as +1, left-
ward as 0 and discarded ﬁxations or periods of signal dropout as
NaN.
GENERALIZED LINEAR MODEL (GLM) ANALYSIS
We applied a regression analysis to distinguish multiple distinct
factors inﬂuencing the gaze response, including effects of pref-
erence and framing condition. A logistic regression with gaze
direction as the dependentmeasure (right= 1 vs. left= 0)modeled
the main effect of preference and interactions of preference with
framing condition. The GLM included additional interactions
between preference and response time and cue onset delay in order
to determine whether these variables contributed to the observed
effects. The model was ﬁt separately at each time point in the trial
relative to stimulus onset. This model treats the log-odds, ηi[t], of
a rightward ﬁxation at time t on trial i as a linear function of the
inputs:
ηi[t] =β0[t] + ri × (β1[t] + β2[t]Bi + β3[t]RTi + β4[t]CDi+
β5[t]BiRTi + β6[t]BiCDi) (1)
Where
ri = rRi − rLi (2)
is the difference between ratings for right and left stimuli, Bi




+1 for keep block
−1 for discard block
RTi is the z-scored response time and CDi is the response cue
delay centered at 1.3 s.
The ﬁrst term in the model is the intercept, capturing a ten-
dency to look either left or right irrespective the stimulus. All
other modeled terms represent the main effect of rating difference
and its interactions.
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Model ﬁtting
The model was ﬁt separately for each participant and time point
using maximum likelihood estimation as implemented in the
GLMFIT function in the Matlab Statistics Toolbox.
Population-level analysis
Population-level effects were evaluated with t-tests applied to
individually ﬁtted parameters at each time sample.
Data exclusion
Data at any time point for which ﬁxation position was not sorted
into one of the two distributions of interest were treated as miss-
ing. Because in some cases a paucity of data at a given time sample
resulted in excessively large estimation error, and hence inﬂated
magnitude in the estimates of the model parameters, a given indi-
vidual’s parameter estimate was excluded in the population-level
analysis if fewer than 50 data points (37% of trials) were used in
ﬁtting the model. Because typically gaze fell on a central ﬁxation
cross at the outset of the trial, the model could not be ﬁt for any
individual before the time of the ﬁrst ﬁxation, roughly 200 ms.
This limitation is reﬂected in the absence of the curves before
200 ms in Figures 2 and 4.
Time contrasts
Additional contrasts were computed over pairwise differences
between parameter estimates at each time point. The aim of this
analysis was to give a more detailed representation of the time-
course of the gaze response, showingwhen differences with respect
to time were signiﬁcance.
RESULTS
EXPERIMENT 1
In Experiment 1, we measured the inﬂuence of food preference
on gaze direction with the correlation between ﬁxation side and
the difference of preference ratings between choice options. This
correlation was computed at each time sample with respect to
onset of the trial, giving the time-varying gaze-preference curve.
In the average across subjects (N = 20), we observed distinct early
and late periods of signiﬁcant positive association (unpaired two-
tailed t-test, FDR correctedQ < 0.05) between pre-trial preference
rating and gaze within. The early phase lasted from 400 to 600 ms
and the late phase extending beyond 900 ms. As the results for
Experiment 1 closely matched those for the keep condition of
Experiment 2, they are not separately displayed.
EXPERIMENT 2
To examine the association between gaze and choice we computed
Pearson’s correlation between gaze position and preference rating
for each time-point in the trial, excluding discarded time points
(NaNs). Figure 2 shows average correlation ±2 SEM across sub-
jects in Experiment 2. Time points differing signiﬁcantly from 0
(t-test, FDR corrected Q < 0.05) are indicated with thick lines
along the abscissa.
Gaze-preference effect in the keep condition
In Experiment 2 we veriﬁed the biphasic structure of the response
seen in Experiment 1 and observed its dependence on framing
and response cue timing. During the keep condition two distinct
phases of signiﬁcant positive correlation (t-test, FDR Q < 0.05)
between preference and gaze response appeared in the average
(N = 23) with an early period of signiﬁcant positive correlation
between 420 and 560ms and late period from 1000ms, replicating
the result of Experiment 1 (Figure 2).
Gaze-preference effect in the discard condition
During the discard block, we saw a brief signiﬁcant gaze bias
toward the non-discarded (i.e. preferred) item at 400–425 ms
(Phase I). This was followed by a phase of increasing bias toward
FIGURE 2 | Gaze preference effect aligned to stimulus onset (t = 0).
Mean ±2 SEM gaze-preference correlation curve for each condition
(N = 23). Thick blue and red lines at the x -axis indicate signiﬁcant
deviations from zero (FDR corrected Q < 0.05). Periods of signiﬁcant
difference between blocks are indicated with the purple line. Right: Area
of the expanded plot (right) is indicated with the gray box. Histograms
(top) show the distributions of cue onsets (green bars) and responses
(black bars).
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the discarded item beginning at 575 ms (Phase II). In both con-
ditions we therefore observed an early phase of gaze bias towards
the more highly rated item and a second phase towards the more
response-compatible item.
Comparison between keep and discard conditions
No statistically signiﬁcant difference between conditions was
observed within the ﬁrst 450 ms, later than the onset of phase
I in both cases, thus we ﬁnd no evidence for a difference of the
onset times for the phase I response across the conditions. In con-
trast, the duration of the phase I response was greatly diminished
in the discard condition, with responses clearly diverging between
450 and 500 ms (paired t-test, FDR Q < 0.05) and remaining
different throughout the rest of the trial. This difference reﬂected
the delayed onset of the phase II response in the keep condition,
which began 425 ms later than in the discard condition.
Time contrasts
To provide more direct statistical evidence for the time-
dependence of the gaze-preference effect, we calculated the average
(N = 23) differences in individual gaze preference curves between
each pair of time sampleswith respect to stimulus onset (Figure 3).
In particular, we wished to observe whether pair-wise contrasts
between time-points supported the differences in direction and
monotonicity between the K and D blocks suggested by Figure 2.
This analysis veriﬁed the non-monotonicity of the gaze-preference
FIGURE 3 | Comparison across time points. To show the signiﬁcance of
non-monotonicity in block K and the differences in the bias towards the
response-compatible item across blocks, the pairwise difference between
time points for individual gaze-preference curves was computed and
averaged across individuals (N = 23), shown as a t -score. Results for the
keep condition are below the diagonal (K), and discard condition above (D).
Plots are thresholded at FDR corrected signiﬁcance of Q < 0.1 and
signiﬁcance levels of Q < 0.05 and Q < 0.01 are indicated, respectively,
with thin and thick contour lines. Each point represents a t-score for the
paired difference between the gaze-preference effect at the time indicated
at the abscissa minus the effect at the time indicated at the ordinate, with
respect to stimulus onset.
curve in theKversionof the task,with themagnitudeof the average
correlation in phases I and II differing signiﬁcantly from interven-
ing period of non-signiﬁcant correlation around 800 ms (paired
t-test, FDR Q < 0.05).
GLM RESULTS
To more clearly distinguish the separate inﬂuences of preference
and task as well as other potentially confounding factors we fol-
lowed up the preceding analysis with a logistic regression on the
data from Experiment 2. Gaze direction served as the depen-
dent measure with task and preference as the main covariates of
interest. Results given here are the averages of individual subjects’
parameter estimates. This analysis revealed the following effects.
Effect of preference rating and framing conditions
Figure 4 shows parameter estimates averaged across subjects for
the inﬂuence of framing and preference on gaze direction. The
effect of preference exhibited a biphasic pattern with an initial
positive loading followed by a negative loading (FDR Q < 0.05).
In contrast, the loading on framing condition increased mono-
tonically. Consistent with the correlation analysis, the combined
effect of framing and preference yielded a biphasic bias of gaze
towards the preferred item in the K condition and an initial bias
toward the preferred item followed by a monotonically increasing
bias towards the less preferred (more response-compatible) item
in the D condition. The regression analysis separates the effect
into distinct contributions of preference and framing, revealing
former to be characterized by an early positive inﬂuence between
400 and 500ms, followed by a reversal of the effect between 700ms
and 1000 ms. The contribution of framing was characterized by
monotonically increasing inﬂuence with a relatively later onset at
500 ms.
Additional terms
Of the additional terms included in the model, signiﬁcant effects
appeared for two. First, the main effect of laterality (Figure 5A)
revealed a prominent tendency to scan items left-to-right. Second,
a signiﬁcant three-way interaction between rating, framing con-
dition and reaction time emerged during both phase I and II, but
not the intervening period between them (Figure 5B). This effect
implies that gaze directed towards the response-compatible item
correlated with speeded reaction during both phases.
Additional terms of the model did not show signiﬁcant effects.
These included the interactions of rating and reaction time, rat-
ing and prompt delay, and the three-way interaction of rating,
prompt delay, and framing condition (Figures 5C–E). The latter
observation suggests that the appearance of the response cue had
little inﬂuence on the gaze response and is therefore unlikely to
contribute to the observed phasic pattern.
DISCUSSION
Our results show two qualitatively different phases in the time
course of attentional bias during choice, supported both by the
bimodal proﬁle of the response in the keep condition and the
differing effects of the keep and discard frame on the two phases
(Figure 2). The regression analysis shown inFigure 4distinguishes
a transitory bias towards the preferred itemassociatedwith phase 1
from a graded monotonic bias towards the response-compatible
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FIGURE 4 | Effects of preference rating (magenta) and block (cyan)
terms on gaze direction as modeled in the GLM with respect to
stimulus onset (t = 0). Left Panel: Average beta values ±2 SEM
over time for each term (N = 23). Right Panel: Paired contrasts
between time points for the preference rating term (R, above the
diagonal) and the block term (B, below the diagonal). Color scale shows
t-scores for the paired contrast between time points thresholded at
FDR corrected signiﬁcance level Q < 0.1. Regions for Q < 0.05 and
Q < 0.01 are indicted with thin and thick contour lines, respectively.
Points represent the t-score for the paired difference between rating
parameter at the time indicated at the abscissa minus the time
indicated at the ordinate.
FIGURE 5 | Contribution of additional terms of the model. A signiﬁcant
(FDR corrected Q < 0.05) effect of the intercept term reﬂects a prominent
tendency for subjects to scan left to right (A). Another term that contributed
signiﬁcantly was the interaction between preference (rating difference), block
type and response time (B), for which a negative value appeared separate in
early and late phases, meaning that reaction time was reduced when the
ﬁxations were directed at the preferred item in the K block and the less
preferred item in the D block during those periods. Additional terms
representing the interactions between preference and (C) the
block-by-cue-delay interaction (D) prompt cue delay and (E) reaction time,
were non-signiﬁcant. In all cases, lines indicate beta values averaged over
individuals (N = 23). Shaded areas represent 2 SEM and time points which
differed signiﬁcantly from 0 at FDR corrected Q < 0.05 are indicated with
thick black line at the abscissa.
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item in phase 2. These observations suggest the inﬂuence of two
processes, the more rapid of which, process 1, biases attention
towards the preferred option, while process 2 directs attention
according to response compatibility. Thus we provide new evi-
dence of separable processes corresponding to early and late
orienting during decision-making as well as evidence for the
contribution of those processes to attentional consequences of
framing.
These results support a dual-system account of orienting and
action selection (Kahneman, 2011). The early phase of gaze-bias
in the “keep” condition occurs rapidly, reﬂecting the inﬂuence of
process 1 on attention towards the motivationally more salient
item. In contrast, the second phase of gaze-bias in the “keep” con-
dition occurs later in the trial. The later andmore framing-speciﬁc
contribution of process 2 regulates attention according to the
particular action required in given a context. The phases emerge
with non-overlapping time courses, suggesting theymay bemutu-
ally inhibitory. That is, to effectively engage either process requires
suppressing any competing outputs of the other.
Dual system models have become commonplace in multiple
areas of psychology, featured in accounts of both attention and
decision-making. Dual processes of visual orienting and percep-
tion (Bar, 2003) to biologically salient stimuli such as faces (de
Gelder and Rouw, 2001; Vuilleumier, 2005) have been widely dis-
cussed. Rapid orienting serves an obvious ecological function,
allowing an organism to respond quickly to threatening conditions
(Sokolov, 1963; Eastwood and Smilek, 2005). In contrast, despite
the interest in the role of dual systems in decision biases (Kah-
neman et al., 1990), comparatively little is understood about the
ecological origins of such biases (McDermott et al., 2008). In the
present case it is reasonably apparent howonemight beneﬁt froma
system tuned to rapidly and efﬁciently identify appetitive stimuli in
the environment, andwhile our studywas not designed to uncover
framing effects in subjects’ pattern of choices, the work of Shaﬁr
on the effect of keep and discard frames has shown that salience of
information, and by implication mechanisms of attention, play a
role in classical framing effects revealed by choice (Shaﬁr,1993). By
linking the attentional effects of framing to multiple systems, we
lay a foundation for a more detailed ecological account of framing
effects.
In a study which applied a similar manipulation of framing,
Shaﬁr presented subjects with a choice between an “impover-
ished” and an “enriched” option, with the latter having more
extreme positive and negative attributes than the former. He
found that choice gravitated towards the enriched option in the
keep frame and the impoverished option in the discard frame.
This he related to compatibility effects, the well established
observation that response difﬁculty is affected by how naturally
responses map onto stimuli (Fitts and Seeger, 1953). For exam-
ple, rapidly pressing a given button in response to the ﬂash of
a given light is easier if corresponding lights and buttons have
the same spatial arrangement. Compatibility effects lend them-
selves to ecological explanation as they arise from the ease with
which a given stimulus-response relationship generalizes from
preexisting dispositions, invoking the advantage of rapid and
highly practiced or innate responses when they are suited to the
context.
In the present case, the outcome of choice led to an equiva-
lent result in both keep and discard frames: participants received
one of the preferred foods. The attentional response neverthe-
less prominently reﬂected compatibility between the stimulus and
framing condition, with subjects attending the less preferred item
more during the discard condition. Because choosing an appet-
itive stimulus naturally entails stimulus-directed orienting and
approach, one may also consider a second order of compatibility:
that between the elicited attentional response and motivational
context. In this respect, the discard condition should create a con-
ﬂict of compatibility between attention and motivational context,
which is absent in the keep condition. Effects related to this mode
of compatibility offer a plausible and parsimonious explanation
for two prominent differences in the gaze response between the
conditions: the greatly reduced duration of the phase I response
in the discard condition and the delayed phase II response in
the keep condition. Both of these effects might be explained by
compatibility-related suppression of process 1 in the discard con-
dition, resulting in a more rapid disinhibition of process 2. Thus
process 2 is inﬂuenced by compatibility between stimulus and
framing condition, while process 1 is modulated according to the
compatibility between the process 2 response and motivational
context.
A future question is whether the opposite pattern of responses
might emerge for aversive stimuli. Such a prediction follows if ori-
enting towards aversive stimuli in the context of avoidancedepends
similarly on process 1. We have shown that two types of compat-
ibility effects described here, between attention and response and
between attention and motivational context, might be separately
manipulated through framing to distinguish their contributions.
These ﬁndings mesh with emerging neurobiological accounts
of attention and decision-making, which have converged on over-
lapping brain systems involving most notably the amygdala. The
amygdala has a well established role in rapid orientation to bio-
logically salient, especially threat-related stimuli (Davis, 1992;
LeDoux, 2000), and associated emotional responses (Adolphs
et al., 1995). Moreover, neural responses in amygdala represent
stimulus value for both appetitive and aversive stimuli (Schoen-
baum et al., 1998; Gottfried et al., 2003; Paton et al., 2006; Morri-
son and Salzman, 2010; Jenison et al., 2011) as well as state value
(Belova et al., 2008), placing it at the nexus of systems that mod-
ulate attention and represent value, and positioning it to mediate
effects of framing with respect to both attention and choice out-
come (De Martino et al., 2006). Such a modulatory role is further
supported by recent evidence from lesionwork inmacaques: while
lesioning amygdala does not abolish the representation of value in
prefrontal cortex, it results in delayed and diminished responses
selectively in orbitofrontal cortex (OFC; Rudebeck et al., 2013).
OFCand associated regions of ventromedial prefrontal cortex have
been implicated in the encoding of relative stimulus value within a
variation of the current task (Lim et al., 2011). Multiple strands of
evidence therefore lead us to expect a role for amygdala in mediat-
ing attentional responses associated, in particular, with process 1,
raising a number of questions about the nature of any contribu-
tion. In line with its role in CS–US conditioning, amygdala might
encode associations that drive system 1 responses. Alternatively,
it might modulate responses elsewhere according to motivational
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context, in line with its close association with other regions of
medial temporal lobe. As a heterogeneous structure, it may also
participant in multiple aspects of these functions.
Along with amygdala, other regions previously associated with
emotion, such as medial prefrontal cortex and insula have also
been implicated in framing (Knutson et al., 2008), highlighting the
importance of emotional responses in framing and other biases
of decision making. Emotions themselves, however, represent a
complex interaction of behavioral dispositions and physiological
responses, which can likely be further decomposed into more ele-
mentary mechanisms, including orienting, arousal, avoidance and
approach behavior (Lang, 1995) as well as the representation of
associated body states in sensory cortices (Damasio, 1994). A bet-
ter understanding of the ecological and neurobiological origins of
framing effects will require a ﬁne-grained separation of the multi-
ple processes that underlie emotions and their relationship tomul-
tiple processes that contribute to decision-making and attention
(Seymour and Dolan, 2008).
A number limitations with the current study should be noted.
First, we have proposed a model of non-overlapping, mutually
competitive processes to explain our observations. An alterna-
tive possibility is suggested by the distinct effects of block and
preference in the GLM (Figure 4): two concurrent processes
that exert an additive inﬂuence on attention. Under this model
the ﬁrst process, corresponding to the effect of preference, must
drive attention initially to the more preferred item and later to
the less preferred item while the second task-dependent pro-
cess, corresponding to the effect of framing condition, becomes
steadily more engaged over time. This alternative model attributes
greater complexity to the ﬁrst process, whose effect in biasing
attention must reverse from the more preferred stimulus to the
less preferred over time, and also requires that the effects of
the two processes happen to cancel initially in the discard con-
dition and later in the keep condition so that no bias of gaze
appears during respective periods. We therefore view this alterna-
tive model as considerably less parsimonious or probable than the
ﬁrst.
We also intentionally limited participants’ choices to foods
they rated positively in order to restrict choices to appetitive
options. Further work should consider whether similarly pha-
sic mechanisms operate in choosing between aversive options.
Finally, the current work was limited to repeated binary choices
between two items, which may not reﬂect processes engaged in
more realistic situations, perhaps better exempliﬁed by a sin-
gle choice between dozens of snacks in a vending machine or
options in the store. Future research should expand beyond
binary choice situations to examine whether the current evi-
dence holds when considering multiple options simultaneously
(Krajbich and Rangel, 2011).
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